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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9078  
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
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RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0346  
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0861  
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0706  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0658  
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0266  
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0170  
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0626  
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0751  
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0828  
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001017

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016  
TAGS: [CH](#) [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [SU](#) [UNSC](#) [KPKO](#)  
SUBJECT: DARFUR RESOLUTION PASSES UNANIMOUSLY WITH SOME  
CHINESE HELP

REF: SECSTATE 78768

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Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN R. BOLTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

11. (C) After three rounds of working-level negotiations and an eleventh-hour Ambassadorial exchange over timing of adoption, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously May 16 to adopt Resolution 1679 (2006), Chapter VII reference and all (text in Paragraph 7). Congo, Denmark, France, Ghana, Greece, Slovakia, Tanzania and the UK co-sponsored the text. Until the late hours of May 15, China, Russia and Qatar pledged to abstain on the text based on the Chapter VII inclusion, but in a surprising and unsolicited move, China reached out to USUN to indicate its strong preference for unanimity and provided a veritable roadmap of what it needed to secure this outcome: omission of a reference to UNSCR 1591 (2005) on Sudan sanctions on which China had abstained. China's change of heart had a domino effect on the other dissenters, with Russia and Qatar ultimately voting in favor of the text.

12. (C) Despite their support for the resolution, China, Russia and Qatar delivered Explanations of Vote. Russian Permanent Representative (PR) Churkin insisted that UNSCR 1679's Chapter VII reference should not pre-determine the mandate of the future UN operation in Darfur, whose presence had yet to be agreed upon by the Government of National Unity (GNU). Chinese Deputy PR Zhang opened by lauding the inclusion in the resolution of a call on non-signatories of the Darfur Peace Agreement to sign and of a request to all parties to honor and implement the Agreement, but concluded with an echo of the Russian intervention. Finally, Qatari PR Al-Nasser, whose delegation had been the least forthcoming in voicing support the text, stressed the need for GNU approval before AMIS transition got underway, citing operative paragraph 4 of the resolution as a 'necessary addition' (NOTE. This paragraph was added during a May 11 Experts Meeting at Chinese suggestion. END NOTE).

13. (C) Following the vote, Chinese Minister Counselor Li

Junhua spoke with PolMinCouns about the seemingly abrupt Chinese decision to move overnight from abstention to support of the resolution. PolMinCouns took note of the positive role the Chinese had played in helping to move the recalcitrant Russians and Qataris toward Council consensus on the resolution. Without mentioning the last-minute wording change on the 1591 reference that supposedly brought his delegation along, Li confided that his mission had heard from Beijing about the strong impression that POTUS had made on visiting President Hu in speaking about the Darfur issue. The Chinese visitors came away with a 'strong impression' of the deep U.S. commitment to early action to address the situation there.

¶4. (C) Li added that the direct contacts of Deputy Secretary Zoellick with Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. Zhou had also helped bring about a fresh look at the Darfur issue. Li also said that, although some had argued that it was not in China's national interest to support the Council's action, these other factors had proved decisive. He concluded by noting that the Chinese were now putting heavy pressure on the Sudanese in Khartoum and Beijing to immediately authorize the visit of a UN assessment team to move the process forward. Li implicitly contrasted the difficult attitude of the Russians with the more forthcoming position of the Chinese on an issue of real importance to the U.S. While this after-the-fact explanation of the change in China's position clearly played to its audience, Li seemed at pains to underline its sincerity.

¶5. (C) In addition to the Chinese about-face, it is equally noteworthy that France was heavily invested in the search for consensus, approaching USUN early about Chinese intentions and offering to intervene and/or encourage other delegations (namely Congo) to do so in order to secure a consensus text.

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A number of factors may be behind these changes of heart - recognition of the high priority we place on Sudan in the Council, visions of swapping support on issues of individual interest - but whatever the motivation, Chinese openness, French collaboration and strong, unified African support may signal cause for optimism as AMIS transition progresses.

¶6. (C) Finally, the securing of UNSCR 1679 was a good example of the merit of an unrelenting approach in pursuing our position on this issue, especially regarding Chapter VII. By refusing to succumb to the stall tactics that have become standard operating procedures for the Chinese, Russian and Qatari delegations and by instead putting the onus on those Members to justify their unfounded hesitation to proceed, we were ultimately able to rally other Members' support (especially from the Africans) and to extract three reluctant 'yes' votes at a time when abstentions seemed imminent.

¶7. (U) Begin UNSCR 1679 text:

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions concerning the situation in the Sudan, in particular resolutions 1665 (2006), 1663 (2006), 1593 (2005), 1591 (2005), 1590 (2005), 1574 (2004), 1564 (2004), 1556 (2004) and the statements of its President concerning the Sudan, in particular S/PRST/2006/5 of 3 February 2006 and S/PRST/2006/21 of 9 May 2006,

Recalling also its resolutions 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict, 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, and 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity of the Sudan, which would be unaffected by transition to a United Nations operation, as well as of all States in the region, and to the

cause of peace, security and reconciliation throughout the Sudan,

Expressing its utmost concern over the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict in Darfur for the civilian population and reiterating in the strongest terms the need for all parties to the conflict in Darfur to put an immediate end to violence and atrocities,

Welcoming the success of the African Union-led Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on the Conflict in Darfur in Abuja, Nigeria, in particular the framework agreed between the parties for a resolution of the conflict in Darfur (the Darfur Peace Agreement),

Commending the efforts of President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, host of the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks in Abuja; President Denis Sassou-Nguesso of the Republic of Congo, Chair of the African Union (AU); Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, the African Union Special Envoy for the Darfur Talks and Chief Mediator, the respective delegations to the Darfur Talks; and the signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement,

Stressing the importance of full and rapid implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement to restore a sustainable peace in Darfur, and welcoming the statement of 9 May 2006 by the representative of the Sudan at the United Nations Security Council Special Session on Darfur of the Government of National Unity's full commitment to implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement,

Reaffirming its concern that the persisting violence in Darfur might further negatively affect the rest of the Sudan, as well as the region, including the security of Chad,

Noting with deep concern the recent deterioration of

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relations between the Sudan and Chad, and urging the Governments of both countries to abide by their obligations under the 8 February 2006 Tripoli Agreement and to implement the confidence-building measures which have been voluntarily agreed upon,

Commending the efforts of the African Union for successful deployment of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), despite exceptionally difficult circumstances, and AMIS's role in reducing large-scale organized violence in Darfur, and commending further the efforts of Member States and regional and international organizations that have assisted AMIS in its deployment,

Taking note of the communiqués of 12 January, 10 March and 15 May 2006 of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union regarding transition of AMIS to a United Nations operation,

Stressing that a United Nations operation would have, to the extent possible, a strong African participation and character,

Welcoming the efforts of Member States and regional and international organizations to maintain and strengthen their support to AMIS and potentially to a follow-on United Nations operation on Darfur, looking forward to, in particular, the convening of a pledging conference in June, and appealing to African Union partners to provide the necessary support to AMIS to allow it to continue to perform its mandate during the transition,

Determining that the situation in the Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

11. Calls upon the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement to respect their commitments and implement the

agreement without delay, urges those parties that have not signed the agreement to do so without delay and not to act in any way that would impede implementation of the agreement, and expresses its intention to consider taking, including in response to a request by the African Union, strong and effective measures, such as a travel ban and assets freeze, against any individual or group that violates or attempts to block the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement;

¶2. Calls upon the African Union to agree with the United Nations, regional and international organizations, and Member States on requirements now necessary, in addition to those identified by the joint assessment mission of December 2005, to strengthen AMIS's capacity to enforce the security arrangements of the Darfur Peace Agreement, with a view to a follow-on United Nations operation in Darfur;

¶3. Endorses the decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council in its communiqu  of 15 May 2006 that, in view of the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement, concrete steps should be taken to effect the transition from AMIS to a United Nations operation, calls upon the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement to facilitate and work with the African Union, the United Nations, regional and international organizations and Member States to accelerate transition to a United Nations operation, and, to this end, reiterating the requests of the Secretary-General and the Security Council, calls for the deployment of a joint African Union and United Nations technical assessment mission within one week of the adoption of this resolution;

¶4. Stresses that the Secretary-General should consult jointly with the African Union, in close and continuing consultation with the Security Council, and in cooperation and close consultation with the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement, including the Government of National Unity, on decisions concerning the transition to a United

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Nations operation;

¶5. Requests the Secretary-General to submit recommendations to the Council within one week of the return of the joint African Union and United Nations assessment mission on all relevant aspects of the mandate of the United Nations operation in Darfur, including force structure, additional force requirements, potential troop-contributing countries and a detailed financial evaluation of future costs;

¶6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

¶8. (U) End UNSCR 1679 text.

BOLTON